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“You Say Nano, We Say No-No:”
Getting a “Yes” Instead for Special
Economic Zones in India
Sumeet Jain*
Abstract: Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have the potential to be valuable instruments of economic growth and development in India. Yet, as a result of the
resistance facing them, SEZs in India have not delivered economic benefits to
their fullest potential. For this reason, reducing the resistance facing SEZs is
critical to their success. This article seeks to reduce this resistance by devising
a consensus-building plan based on a regulatory negotiation approach. The article first shows that the past and present resistance facing India’s economic
zones is a product of the lack of public input in the design of their policy. It then
presents a platform for understanding the proponents’ and opponents’ arguments by distilling the current legislation and regulation governing India’s SEZ
policy into a cohesive operational framework. Next, the article examines proponents’ and opponents’ arguments pertaining to the operational framework of
the SEZ policy. Finally, the article seeks to retroactively counterbalance the
lack of public input in the design process of India’s SEZ policy by suggesting
two sets of reforms to the operational framework. One set of reforms—
procedural reforms—suggests securing greater opponent involvement in the establishment and operation of SEZs. The other set—substantive reforms—
recommends rules that will further opponent interests through, not despite, the
establishment and operation of SEZs.
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INTRODUCTION
“[Y]ou say Nano, we say no-no,” bellowed Mamata Banerjee, a prominent leftist politician1 in West Bengal,2 during a protest aimed at halting
production of Tata Motors’ Nano.3 The protest against the production of
the Tata Nano was directed at the establishment of the factory in Singur,
West Bengal.4 Tata Motors’ Singur facility was established in a Special
1
Leftists’ concerns in India are represented not only by well-known leftist political parties, such as the Communist Party of India (Marxist), but also a broad spectrum of nonpolitical organizations and individuals. Leftists place a heavy emphasis on economic egalitarianism, and, as a result, often oppose unchecked capitalism and globalization. Leftists in
India particularly disapprove of the “land grabs” and displacement that accompany SEZs.
Nivedita Menon, ‘End of the Left’ in India? Statement by Leftists After Recent Election Results, KAFILA (May 24, 2011), http://kafila.org/2011/05/ 24/end-of-the-left-in-indiastatement-after-recent-election-results/; see also Cash Cows, ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 2006, at
45–46, available at http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id
=E1_RDPTNTJ.
2
See Biography of Mamata Banerjee, ALL INDIA TRINAMOOL CONGRESS,
http://www.aitmc.org/theleaderspeaks.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
3
Mehul Srivastava, For Tata in India: Industry vs. Farms, BUS. WK. (Aug. 27, 2008,
12:16 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_36/b4098000380054.htm.
Priced at U.S. $2,500 and dubbed the “People’s Car,” the Nano is Tata Motors’ most eagerly
awaited project. Id.
4
Mehul Srivastava, Why Indian Farmers are Fighting Tata’s Nano, BUS. WK. (Aug. 27,
2008, 10:06 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2008/gb20080827
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Economic Zone (SEZ),5 an area where economic incentives are offered to
investors with the objective of attracting investment.6 Ultimately, the protests forced Tata Motors to abandon plans to manufacture the Nano in Singur.7
Sadly, the protest in Singur is only one of several high-profile protests
against India’s SEZs.8 These protests have a twofold detrimental effect on
the country’s SEZ policy. First, social barriers, such as threats to safety,
mounted by the protests undercut the economic benefits that SEZ legislation and regulation provide.9 Second, political pressure generated by the
protests leads to legislative and regulatory uncertainty that undermines legal
predictability and economic stability in SEZs.10 As a result of the social
barriers and legislative and regulatory uncertainty plaguing them, India’s
SEZs have not delivered economic benefits to their fullest potential.11
In light of these dynamics, addressing the cause of these problems—
the popular resistance facing SEZs—is critical to the success of India’s
SEZs. The popular resistance facing India’s SEZs is largely a product of

_001413.htm. The protesters demand that Tata Motors return the 400 acres of land requisitioned for the Singur factory to local farmers. Talks over Tata Nano Car Deadlock, BBC
NEWS (Sept. 5, 2008, 3:12 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/ 7599466.stm.
5
Tata May Bid Adieu to Singur SEZ, INDIAN REALTY NEWS (Aug. 31, 2008),
http://www.indianrealtynews.com/sezs-india/tata-may-bid-adieu-to-singur-sez.html.
6
Kwan Yiu Wong & David K.Y. Chu, Export Processing Zones and Special Economic
Zones as Generators of Economic Development: The Asian Experience, 66 GEOGRAFISKA
ANNALER: SERIES B, HUM. GEOGRAPHY 1, 3 (1984).
7
Tata Abandons Cheapest Car Plant, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2008, 3:45 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7651119.stm (Ratan Tata, Chairman of Tata Group,
stated, “[w]e have little choice but to move out of Bengal.”).
8
Protests against SEZs have occurred nationwide. See, e.g., NANDIGRAM: WHAT
REALLY
HAPPENED?
(2007),
available
at
http://insafindia.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/07/nandi.pdf (Nandigram, West Bengal in March 2007); Farmers
Block Traffic on NH8 in Protest against Gurgaon SEZ, ONEINDIA NEWS (May 13, 2007, 9:09
PM), http://news.oneindia.in/2007/ 05/13/farmers-block-traffic-on-nh8-in-protest-againstgurgaon-sez-1179070736.html (Gurgaon, Haryana in July 2008); Satish Nandgaonkar, Land
TELEGRAPH
(Oct.
5,
2008),
Protest
in
Maharashtra,
THE
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081005/jsp/nation/story _9929646.jsp (Raigad, Maharashtra in October 2008); Raju Nayak, Goa Protests Can Dampen New Year Party, EXPRESS
INDIA (Dec. 27, 2007) http://www.indianexpress.com/ news/goa-protests-can-dampen-newyear-party/254583 (Panjim, Goa in December 2007); Protest Against Coastal Zone Notification, THE HINDU (Aug. 10, 2007), http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/10/stories/
2007081061370900.htm (Cuddalore, Tamil Nadu in August 2007).
9
See infra text accompanying note 78.
10
See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
11
See Lauren Fulton, India’s Way: Crafting Special Economic Zones, 28 HARV. INT’L
REV., Winter 2007, at 7, available at http://hir.harvard.edu/ethnic-conflict/indias-way (“India
has great potential to achieve further prosperity. An effective SEZ program will draw more
funding from the private sector for infrastructure improvement and generate more employment opportunities for its large population.”).
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the lack of public input in the design of the policy.12 This article seeks to
retroactively counterbalance the lack of public input in the design process
of India’s SEZ policy by devising a consensus-building plan based on a
regulatory negotiation approach. In so doing, this article is comprised of
four parts. Part I tracks the historical failure of economic zones13 in India
arising out of autocratic rulemaking by the Central Government. Part II
presents a platform for understanding the proponents’ and opponents’ arguments by distilling the current legislation and regulation governing India’s SEZ policy into a cohesive operational framework. Part III examines
proponents’ and opponents’ arguments pertaining to the operational framework of the SEZ policy. Part IV seeks to reconcile these views by suggesting two sets of consensus-building reforms to the operational framework.
The first set of reforms—procedural reforms—focuses on securing greater
opponent involvement in the establishment and operation of SEZs. The second set of reforms—substantive reforms—focuses on introducing rules
that will further opponent interests through, not despite, the establishment
and operation of SEZs.
I. TROUBLED HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA
Autocratic rulemaking by the Central Government, characterized by a
lack of public input, over India’s policy on economic zones is largely culpable for their lack of success. Initially, under India’s socialist economic
mandate, economic zones were employed without consideration of commercial feasibility. Presently, under India’s recent neoliberal economic
mandate, economic zones are being employed without regard for leftist
concerns. This centralized rulemaking is a common hallmark throughout
the history of India’s economic zone policy. To date, the Indian experience
with economic zones can be divided into four periods: (i) 1965–1977, (ii)
1977–1991, (iii) 1991–2000, and (iv) 2000 onwards. As a result of centralized rulemaking in each period, success has eluded India’s economic zones.
A. 1965–1977: The Initial Experiment with Economic Zones
The Indian government’s disregard for pro-business interests contrib-

12
See Sonila Swaminathan, People’s Memorandum on Special Economic Zones in India,
FOCUS ON THE GLOBAL SOUTH—INDIA PROGRAMME (Sept. 13, 2006, 2:38 AM),
http://focusweb.org/india/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=830 [hereinafter
People’s Memorandum on SEZs in India].
13
“Economic zone” is the general term used to describe an area in which the government
gives businesses incentives to engage in various types of economic activity. AMITENDU
PALIT & SUBHOMOY BHATTACHARJEE, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA: MYTHS AND
REALITIES 3 (2008). This term encompasses (i) special economic zones (SEZs), (ii) export
processing zones (EPZs), (iii) industrial zones, (iv) enterprise zones, (v) information processing zones, (vi) financial services zones, (vii) commercial free zones, and (viii) free ports.
Id. at 4–6.
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uted to the failure of the country’s first economic zones. India’s initial experimentation with economic zones was chiefly a product of Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru’s socialist legacy.14 Under Nehru, the government adopted a plan of self-sufficient industrialization.15 This plan was implemented
by adopting a model of import-substitution industrialization (ISI)16—a set
of trade protectionist measures aimed at developing domestic industry.17
Specifically, India employed an outward-looking ISI model—a set of
measures aimed at developing domestic industry by simultaneously restricting imports and promoting exports.18 The government restricted imports by
requiring “scrutiny and approval by the Central Government of every individual case of participation [of] foreign capital and management in industry.”19 At the same time, it boosted exports through a “systematic pro14
The tone of India’s socialist economy was set shortly before India’s independence in
1947. The “Bombay Plan” of 1945, a set of proposals from leading Indian industrialists for
the development of India’s post-independence economy, suggested that “the State should
exercise in the interests of the community a considerable measure of intervention and control.” PURSHOTAMDAS THAKURDAS ET AL., MEMORANDUM OUTLINING A PLAN OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT FOR INDIA (PARTS ONE AND TWO) 90 (1945). India’s post-independence economic policy followed the Bombay Plan’s call for a socialist economy. The preamble of the
Constitution of India, promulgated in 1950, defines India as a “socialist . . . republic.” INDIA
CONST. pmbl. Consistent with this preambular mandate, Article 39, a directive principle of
state policy, requires the state to ensure that “ownership and control of the material resources
of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good” and “operation of
the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production
to the common detriment.” Id. at art. 39(b)–(c). To achieve these ends, Jawaharlal Nehru,
the first Prime Minister of India, declared it necessary to “make the State more and more the
organizer of constructive industry, and not the private capitalist or anyone else.” Jawaharlal
Nehru, Prime Minister of India, The Only Right Approach, Speech Delivered at the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) (Apr. 7, 1948), in JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, INDEPENDENCE AND
AFTER: A COLLECTION OF SPEECHES 1946–1949 175 (2d ed. 1971). Under the initial chairmanship of Nehru, India’s economic plans were laid out in “seemingly socialistic” Five-Year
Plans. Jona Aravind Dohrmann, Special Economic Zones in India—An Introduction, 106
ASIEN 60, 61 (2008); see also Asoka Mehta, Jawaharlal Nehru—Social Justice and National Development, in INDIAN ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 5–6 (Ashok V.
Bhuleshkar ed., 1969). The coupling of Nehru’s socialist economic policies with Gandhi’s
model of swadesi—self-reliance—made striving for self-sufficient industrialization the
hallmark of Indian economic policies in the years following independence. Dohrmann, supra, at 61. India’s movement for self-sufficient industrialization resulted in protectionism of
domestic industry through “legally comprehensive” government controls over foreign trade.
B.R. SHENOY, INDIAN ECONOMIC POLICY 49 (1968).
15
JALEEL AHMAD, IMPORT SUBSTITUTION, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (Edward I. Altman & Ingo Walter eds., 1978).
16
Aradhna Aggarwal, Performance of Export Processing Zones: A Comparative Analysis
of India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 7 (Indian Council for Research on Int’l Econ. Relations,
Working Paper No. 155, 2005), available at http://www.icrier.org/pdf/wp155.pdf.
17
AHMAD, supra note 15, at 3.
18
Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 7.
19
GOV’T OF INDIA, INDUSTRIAL POLICY RESOLUTION ¶ 10 (1948), available at
http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/policies/iip.htm.
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gramme” of export promotion.20
India first employed economic zones under this systematic program of
export promotion. These first economic zones were categorized as Export
Processing Zones (EPZs), a type of economic zone aimed at incentivizing
investors to participate in export businesses.21 EPZs achieved this objective
by providing a variety of fiscal incentives to export-oriented businesses,
such as exemption from import duty on raw materials and capital goods.22
Asia’s first EPZ was established in 1965 in Kandla (Gujarat).23 In 1973, the
Indian government launched a second EPZ in Mumbai (Maharashtra).24
Unfortunately, the cumbersome nature of the EPZ policy made painfully
obvious the lack of input from pro-business constituents. First, the fiscal
incentives and the facilities offered for operating in EPZs were not attractive enough to motivate investors to participate.25 Second, a highly centralized structure in which zone authorities had “limited powers” led to a rigid
and nonnegotiable system.26 Third, entrepreneurs had to acquire multiple
individual clearances before beginning operations.27 Fourth, “[d]ay-to-day
operations were subjected to rigorous controls.”28 In particular, the Central
Government’s restrictions on imports, which in turn restricted the importation of foreign capital, suffocated growth in EPZs.29 Consequently, “EPZs

[W]hile it should be industrial that participation of foreign capital and enterprise,
particularly as regards industrial technique and knowledge, will be of value to the
rapid industrialization of the country, it is necessary that the conditions under
which they may participate in Indian industry should be carefully regulated in the
national interest. Suitable legislation will be introduced for this purpose. Such
Legislation will provide for the scrutiny and approval by the Central Government
of every individual case of participation [of] foreign capital and management in
industry.
Id.
20
PLANNING COMM’N, THIRD FIVE YEAR PLAN ch. 8, ¶ 10 (1961) (India), available at
http://planningcommission.gov.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/3rd/3planch8.html.
21
PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 4.
22
CENT. BD. OF EXCISE & CUSTOMS, MINISTRY OF FIN., EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE
SCHEME (India) [hereinafter EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE SCHEME], available at
http://121.241.246.157/customs/cs-manual/manual_22%28c%29.htm (last visited Nov. 30,
2011).
23
SEZ DIV., MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS., GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES (SEZS) 2 (Oct 27, 2010) (India) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR
DEVELOPMENT OF SEZS], available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/Instructions/
Instruction%20No.65.pdf.
24
Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 7.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
MINISTRY OF ENVT & FORESTS, TECHNICAL EIA GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR INDUSTRIAL
ESTATES, annexure II at ii (2009) (India), available at http://moef.nic.in/Manuals/
TGM_Industrial%20Estates.pdf (“there were insular policies, focused on import minimiza-
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were not able to emerge as effective instruments for export promotion on
account of multiplicity of controls and clearances, absence of world-class
infrastructure and an unstable fiscal regime.”30 A lack of input from probusiness constituents largely shoulders the blame for the commercial infeasibility of the EPZ policy.
B. 1977–1991: Increasing Reliance on EPZs
A disregard for pro-business interests in the EPZ policy persisted between 1977 and 1991. In the first half of this period, the government appointed various committees to review the performance of EPZs.31 These
committees correctly identified many of the handicaps facing the EPZ policy, notably infrastructural deficiencies and a lack of access to foreign raw
materials and capital.32 The committees even made “several concrete recommendations” to improve the performance of the EPZs.33 Still, the policy
regime remained “virtually static.”34
Later during this period, however, the government relaxed import restrictions. Fueled by India’s failure to significantly increase export volume
through ISI policies, official thinking in the late 1970s began veering round
to the view that ISI could no longer deliver satisfactory economic growth.35
Instead, policy-makers believed that export-oriented industrialization (EOI),
an outward policy of encouraging exports and removing import restrictions,36 held far greater potential.37 The belief that ISI policies should
be replaced by EOI policies originated from the thought that import liberalization would aid export promotion by facilitating the infusion of foreign
technologies and capital into domestic industry.38 Thus, transitioning from
tion (vs. trade enhancement through export promotion)”).
30
K. NARINDAR JETLI & VISHAL SETHI, INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA: POSTLIBERALISATION INITIATIVES AND CHALLENGES 117 (2007). FDI policy was especially restrictive. In fact, according to the Business Environment Rating Index, a ranking of investment climate in forty-three countries, Indian EPZs placed last for FDI. Aggarwal, supra
note 16, at 7.
31
Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 8.
32
See id. (The committees identified several handicaps: “the absence of a policy, absence of implementation authority to centrally co-ordinate and control the zones, procedural
constraints, infrastructural deficiencies, limited concessions and limited powers of the zone
authorities to take actions on the spot resulting in inordinate delays.”).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
B. Uday Shankar, Some Recent Trends in the Indian Economy, SOC. SCIENTIST, Dec.
1982, at 32, 33.
36
KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 442–43 (7th ed.
2004).
37
See Shankar, supra note 35, at 33.
38
See GOV’T OF INDIA, INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMENT ¶ 15 (1977), available at
http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/policies/iip.htm [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMENT
(1977)].
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an outward-looking ISI framework to an EOI one, the Industrial Policy
Statement of 1977 advanced import liberalization39 and vigorous export
promotion.40 To promote exports, the government vowed to consider “favourable proposals” from private investors to enhance export-oriented manufacturing capacity, such as establishing EPZs.41 Accordingly, the government approved the establishment of four more EPZs in 1984 in Noida
(Uttar Pradesh), Falta (West Bengal), Cochin (Kerala), and Chennai (Tamil
Nadu).42
However, falling victim to the unchanged burdensome laws that hindered the progress of the Kandla and Mumbai EPZs,43 none of the EPZs established in 1984 were successful at export promotion.44 As an additional
means to promote exports, the Industrial Policy Statement of 1980 suggested the supplementary strategy of “sympathetically consider[ing] requests
for setting up 100% export oriented units” (EOUs).45 This scheme accorded
individual EOUs the flexibility to be established beyond the boundaries of
EPZs, while still receiving fiscal benefits46 provided to units in EPZs.47
However, since EOUs were also subject to the burdensome laws governing
EPZs, “striking success . . . eluded” the EOU scheme as well.48 Although
import restrictions were loosened, the same cumbersome controls and clearances that burdened India’s first EPZs continued to hamper the EPZ and
EOU schemes. The continued use of commercially infeasible EPZ and
EOU policies suggests that a lack of input from pro-business constituents
39
See id. (“[T]he progress that we have made in the industrial field should now enable us
to selectively dispense with import quotas and quantitative restrictions, while retaining the
protection given through tariffs.”); see also Shankar, supra note 35, at 33.
40
See INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMENT (1977), supra note 38, ¶ 16.

Exports of manufactures are an important and growing segment of our export
trade. Government will consider favourable proposals for export-oriented manufacturing capacity in fields where such investment is likely to be internationally
competitive . . . . In the case of wholly export-based activities, Government will
also be willing to consider exemption from customs/excise duties on inputs . . . .
Id. See also Shankar, supra note 35, at 33.
41
See INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMENT (1977), supra note 38, ¶ 16.
42
Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 8.
43
See supra text accompanying note 30.
44
See Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 8.
45
GOV’T OF INDIA, INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMENT ¶ 23 (1980), available at
http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/policies/iip.htm.
46
See EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE SCHEME, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
47
CENT. BD. OF EXCISE & CUSTOMS, MINISTRY OF FIN., EXPORT ORIENTED UNIT SCHEME
(India), available at http://121.241.246.157/customs/cs-manual/manual_22%28b%29.htm
(last visited Nov. 30, 2011). Since most of the six EPZs in India were located in “industrially backward regions,” EOUs had an incentive to establish their facilities beyond the boundaries of existing EPZs. See Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 8.
48
1 PLANNING COMM’N, SEVENTH FIVE YEAR PLAN ¶ 6.45 (1985) (India), available at
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/7th/vol1/7v1ch6.html.
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persisted.
C. 1991–2000: Liberalizing EPZs
As part of a massive dose of liberalization in 1991, the Indian government tried to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by restructuring the
EPZ policy without regard for leftist concerns. When India’s economy felt
the ripple effects of the Gulf War, the Indian government sought loans from
the World Bank.49 In return, the World Bank demanded liberalization of
the Indian economy.50 Ultimately, India was forced to adopt a set of free
market policies in 1991.51 These free market policies gave rise to a new
understanding that attracting FDI was “in the interest of the country’s industrial development.”52 As India’s economic agenda towards EOI transformed from a grudging acceptance to a full embrace, the 1991 Statement
of Industrial Policy maintained import liberalization, maintained export
promotion, and relaxed restrictions over FDI.53 Additionally, as part of a
set of measures aimed at attracting FDI, the government broadened the
scope of the EPZ and EOU schemes in 1992, 1994, and 1996. In 1992, the
EPZ and EOU schemes were broadened to include the agriculture, horticulture, and aqua-culture sectors.54 In 1994, these schemes were further expanded to include trading, re-engineering, and reconditioning units.55 In
1996, the EPZ and EOU schemes were once again enlarged to include infrastructure, non-conventional energy, electronics, software, and a few other
sectors having a significant export potential.56 During this period of liberalization, leftist interests were left vulnerable to full-blown proliferation of
EPZs and EOUs.

49

Dohrmann, supra note 14, at 62. The Indian government was prompted to seek loans
from the World Bank only upon reaching near insolvency after foreign transfers from the
Gulf Region dried up. Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
GOV’T OF INDIA, STATEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY ¶ 24 (1991), available at
http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/policies/iip.htm. The Government of India welcomed foreign
investment, reasoning that it would bring the “attendant advantages” of technology transfer,
marketing expertise, introduction of modern managerial techniques, and new possibilities for
promotion of exports. Id.
53
Id. ¶¶ 24–26. To invite FDI in “high priority industries, requiring large investments
and advanced technology,” the 1991 Statement of Industrial Policy granted automatic approval for (i) FDI in these select industries, so long as the total foreign investment in the industry was not greater than 51%, and (ii) technology agreements related to high priority industries within specified parameters. Id. ¶¶ 25, 28.
54
Aggarwal, supra note 16, at 9.
55
Id.
56
2 PLANNING COMM’N, NINTH FIVE YEAR PLAN, ¶ 5.4 (1997) (India), available at
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/9th/vol2/v2c5.htm.
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D. 2000–Present: The Emergence of SEZs
The Central Government continued to ignore leftist interests as the
EPZ scheme was replaced with the SEZ scheme. India’s EPZ scheme
evolved into the current SEZ scheme out of the realization that attracting
FDI required India to develop “well-functioning infrastructure.”57 In early
2000, Murasoli Maran, India’s then-Minister of Commerce and Industry,
visited SEZs in China.58 Inspired by the infrastructural developments that
SEZs generated in China, Mr. Maran introduced the concept of SEZs to the
Indian economy in March 2000 through the annual update to the Export and
Import (EXIM) Policy of 1997–2002.59 Section 9A.1 of the updated EXIM
Policy of 1997–2002 defines an SEZ as “a specifically delineated duty free
enclave [which] shall be deemed to be foreign territory for the purposes of
trade operations and duties and tariffs.”60 A fairly detailed set of guidelines,
including provisions relating to a proposed administrative regime, follow
this definition.61
The Foreign Trade Policy (FT Policy) of 2004–2009 echoed the provisions listed in the updated EXIM Policy of 1997–2002.62 Under both the
updated EXIM Policy of 1997–2002 and FT Policy of 2004–2009, incentives and other facilities were offered to SEZ developers and SEZ units on
an ad hoc basis “through various notification[s] and circulars issued by the
concerned [Ministries and Departments].”63 This procedure did not inspire
confidence in investors to commit resources to SEZs.64 To provide legal
predictability, India’s Parliament saw the need to legitimize and streamline
SEZ guidelines and procedures through legislation.65
57

Dohrmann, supra note 14, at 62. Note, however, that the EOU scheme continues to
operate separately from the SEZ scheme. PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 129.
58
P. ARUNACHALAM, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS 1–2 (2008).
59
Id. at 2. See also DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS., EXPORT
AND IMPORT POLICY ch. 9A (1997, update effective Apr. 1, 2000) (India) [hereinafter
UPDATED EXIM POLICY (1997)], available at http://exim.indiamart.com/indian-eximpolicy/special-economic-zones.html.
60
UPDATED EXIM POLICY (1997), supra note 59, ch. 9A.1.
61
See id. ch. 9A. The updated EXIM Policy of 1997–2002 lays out the structure of how
the central and state governments shall approve applications for SEZs, and how they shall
monitor performance of these zones. See id. ch. 9A.5–9A.7.
62
See generally DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS., FOREIGN
TRADE POLICY ch. 7 (2004) (India), available at http://dgftcom.nic.in/exim/2000/policy/
chap-07.htm.
63
Press Release, Dep’t of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Indus., SEZ Bill to
Give a Big Push to Exports and FDI (May 10, 2005), http://commerce.nic.
in/pressrelease/pressrelease_detail.asp?id=1492 (India).
64
Id.
65
Id. (“To provide a long-term and stable policy . . . , a Central Act for Special Economic Zones [was] found to be necessary in line with international practice.”); GUIDELINES FOR
DEVELOPMENT OF SEZS, supra note 23, at 2 (SEZ legislation and regulation was passed with
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In May 2005,66 the Parliament of India passed the Special Economic
Zones Act (SEZ Act)67 to “provide for the establishment, development and
management of the Special Economic Zones . . . .”68 The SEZ Act received
presidential assent, and thereby came into force in June 2005.69 Section 55
of the SEZ Act permits the Central Government to promulgate rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act.70 Accordingly, the Central Government
passed the Special Economic Zones Rules71 (SEZ Rules) on February 10,
2006 to carry out the provisions of the SEZ Act.72 The Central Government
designed this legislation and regulation largely without public input.73 Still,
by September 2010, 585 SEZs had been formally approved74 and forty-two
SEZs had earned in-principal approval75 under the SEZ Act. Additionally,
the existing EPZs were converted into SEZs.76
However, following the lack of public input in India’s SEZ policy, the
policy faces nationwide protests.77 These protests have a twofold detrimental effect on the SEZ policy. First, social barriers, such as threats to
safety, mounted by the protests against SEZs undercut the economic benefits that SEZ legislation and regulation provide. Ratan Tata, Chairman of
Tata Group, explained that Tata Motors had to abandon its Singur facility

an intent to “signal the Government’s commitment to a stable SEZ regime . . . .”).
66
Dep’t of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Indus., Introduction to SEZs in India,
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA, http://www.sezindia.nic.in/about-introduction.asp (India) (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
67
Special Economic Zones Act, No. 28 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2011), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in.
68
Id. pmbl. See also GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SEZS, supra note 23, at 2.
69
Special Economic Zones Act, pmbl (India).
70
Id. § 55.
71
Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Feb. 10, 2006),
available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SEZ_Rules_July_2010.pdf.
72
Id.
73
People’s Memorandum on SEZs in India, supra note 12 (“The SEZ Act was passed in
haste without much public debate. There was no public consultation; participation and debate on the SEZ Act facilitated by the Ministry. Even in Rajya Sabha the Upper House of
Indian Democracy has passed this bill with a one day discussion undermining many of the
objections.”).
74
Dep’t of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Indus., List of Formal Approvals
Granted under SEZ Act, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA, http://www.sezindia.nic.
in/writereaddata/pdf/ListofFormalapprovals.pdf (India) (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) [hereinafter List of Formal SEZ Approvals Granted].
75
Dep’t of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Indus., List of In-principal Approvals
Granted under SEZ Act, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA, http://www.sezindia.nic.in/
writereaddata/pdf/Listofin-principleapprovals.pdf (India) (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) [hereinafter List of In-Principal SEZ Approvals Granted].
76
G. Srinivasan, Special Economic Zone Act: ‘Provides the Right Combination of Facilities,’ THE HINDU BUSINESS LINE (Nov. 29, 2005), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/
2005/11/29/stories/2005112902031100.htm.
77
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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because it “[could not] run a factory with police around all the time.”78
Thus, despite the preferential economic treatment offered to investors in
SEZs, social barriers render operating in SEZs prohibitively inefficient.
Second, political pressure generated by the protests against SEZs leads to
legislative and regulatory uncertainty that undermines legal predictability
and economic stability in SEZs. In response to widespread protests, the Indian government has frequently revised India’s SEZ policy. In the five
years since the SEZ Rules have come into effect, there have been thirteen
amendments.79 More disturbingly, the SEZ policy was placed on a “goslow”80 upon recommendation by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Commerce to suspend approvals.81 Such legislative and regulatory uncer78

Tata Abandons Cheapest Car Plant, supra note 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Special Economic Zones (Amendment) Rules, 2006, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i)
(Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/dated-10-8-06amending-sez-rules06.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Second Amendment) Rules, 2007,
GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(ii) (Mar. 16, 2007), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.
in/writereaddata/rules/sez-snd-amend-rules2007.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Second
Amendment) Rules, 2007, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(ii) (Oct. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/Third_Amendment-3rd_October_2007.pdf;
Special Economic Zones (Amendment) Rules, 2008, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(ii) (Nov. 14,
2008),
available
at
http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SEZRules2008
_Amendment_.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Amendment) Rules, 2009, GAZETTE OF INDIA, §
II(3)(i) (Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/
rules/SpecialEconomicZone%20_Amendment_%20Rules2009.pdf; Special Economic Zones
(Second Amendment) Rules, 2009, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(ii) (May 20, 2009), available
at
http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SezRules2009%20_
SecondAmendment.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Third Amendment) Rules, 2009, GAZETTE OF INDIA, §
II(3)(i) (Aug. 3, 2009), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/
rules/Final3_Rule_Amendment.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Amendment) Rules, 2010,
GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (June 14, 2010), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.
in/writereaddata/rules/SEZ_Rule_amendment_10.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Second
Amendment) Rules, 2010, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (July 12, 2010), available at
http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/rules1.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Third
Amendment) Rules, 2010, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Sept. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/rules2.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Fourth
Amendment) Rules, 2010, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Sept. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/Rule4.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Fifth
Amendment) Rules, 2010, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Nov. 10, 2010), available at
http://sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/Rule5.pdf; Special Economic Zones (Sixth Amendment) Rules, 2010, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Dec. 16, 2010), available at
http://sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/Rule6.pdf.
80
Govt to Go Slow on IT SEZ Approval, TIMES OF INDIA (Nov. 8, 2006, 11:37 PM),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/374329.cms.
81
In its eighty-third report, the Parliamentary Standing Committee Report “recommend[ed] that no further SEZs should be notified till the SEZ Act and the Rules made thereunder have been amended to meet the public concerns with regard to various provisions contained in the said Act and Rules.” DEP’T RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMM. ON
COMMERCE, PARLIAMENT OF INDIA, EIGHTY THIRD REPORT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONES ¶ 6.5 (2007), available at http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports
/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20Commerce/Report%20SEZ1.htm. In its eighty79
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tainty undermines the economic stability and legal predictability that is
supposed to attract investment in SEZs in the first place.82 As a result of the
social barriers and the legislative and regulatory uncertainty facing them,
SEZs in India have not delivered economic benefits to their fullest potential. Ultimately, the lack of public input in the operational framework, and
the ensuing protests, restrict SEZs in India from realizing their economic
potential.83
II. OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SEZS
The SEZ Act and SEZ Rules together create an operational framework
for SEZs that can be divided into three stages. Initially, the SEZ Developer
(Developer)84 must earn approval for a proposed SEZ. Next, the Developer
must transform the approved SEZ into an operating entity by securing land
and SEZ Units (Units).85 Finally, as the SEZ becomes operational, Developers and Units may begin to take advantage of incentives associated with
SEZs.
A. The Approval Process for SEZs
SEZs may be established jointly or severally by the Central Government, a state government, or any private entity.86 The application procedure
varies for each of these prospective Developers. A private entity may sub-

seventh report, the next report pertaining to SEZs, the Parliamentary Standing Committee
regretfully noted that the Government approved and notified some SEZs despite the Committee’s recommendation in the eighty-third report to suspend the policy altogether. DEP’T
RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMM. ON COMMERCE, PARLIAMENT OF INDIA, EIGHTY
SEVENTH REPORT ON ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS/
OBSERVATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE CONTAINED IN ITS 83RD REPORT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES (SEZS) ¶ 6.5 (2008), available at http://164.100.47.5
/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20Commerce/87th%20repor
t.htm. The Committee proceeded to reiterate its recommendation to suspend the SEZ policy.
Id.
82
Shaveta Gupta, Special Economic Zones: A Smoldering Issue, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES 241, 242, 246–47 (Prabha Shastri Ranade ed.,
2007); see also Sunil Bharti Mittal, Founder, Chairman, and Group Managing Director,
Bharti Enterprises, India’s New Entrepreneurial Classes: The High Growth Economy and
Why It Is Sustainable, Remarks at the Annual Lecture at the Center for the Advanced Study
of India at the University of Pennsylvania (Nov. 10, 2005), available at
http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/system/files/Mittal_2006.pdf (“I personally believe that for an entrepreneur the important need is stable policies . . . .”).
83
Fulton, supra note 11.
84
A “Developer” is a private entity or state government that has been granted a letter of
approval to develop an SEZ. Special Economic Zones Act, No. 28 of 2005, § 2(g), INDIA
CODE (2011), available at http://indiacode.nic.in.
85
A “Unit” is business unit operating within an SEZ. Id. § 2(zc).
86
Id. § 3(1).
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mit a proposal either to the Board of Approval (Board)87 or to a state government.88 If submitted to a state government, the government must forward the private entity’s proposal and its recommendation to the Board
within forty-five days from the date of receipt.89 Alternatively, a state government may submit its proposal for an SEZ directly to the Board.90 The
Central Government cannot independently make and submit an SEZ proposal; but, it may suo moto91 establish an SEZ for which a proposal has
been previously submitted by a state government.92
However, an SEZ may only be established upon receiving approval
from the Board. The Board is comprised of up to nineteen members.93
Most of these members are nominated by the Central Government.94 The
state government where the proposed SEZ is being developed has authority
to nominate only one member.95 Interestingly, all the acts of the Board are
decided by a “general consensus of the Members present.”96 Three main

87

Id. § 3(4).
Id. § 3(2).
89
Id. § 3(6); Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006, §4, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Feb.
10, 2006), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SEZ_Rules
_July_2010.pdf.
90
Special Economic Zones Act, § 3(4) (India).
91
“On their or its own initiative, without external prompting or explicit demand.” Suo
moto Definition, WORDWEB ONLINE, http://www.wordwebonline.com/en/SUOMOTO (last
visited Nov. 30, 2011).
92
Special Economic Zones Act, § 3(4) (India).
93
Id. §§ 8(2)(a)–8(2)(i).
94
The Central Government has the authority to nominate: (i) a Chairperson, “an officer
not below the rank of an Additional Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry or
Department of the Central Government dealing with Commerce;” (ii) two Members, “officers not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India nominated . . . to represent the Ministry or Department of the Central [Government] dealing with revenue;” (iii) a
Member, an “officer not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India to be
nominated to represent the Ministry or Department of the Central [Government] dealing with
economic affairs;” (iv) up to ten Members, officers “not below the rank of a Joint Secretary
to the Government of India” nominated “to represent the Ministry or Department of the Central Government dealing with commerce, industrial policy and promotion, science and technology, small scale industries and agro and rural industries, home affairs, defense, environment and forests, law, overseas Indian affairs and urban development;” (v) a Member, “a
nominee of the State Government concerned;” (vi) a Member, “the Director General of Foreign Trade or his nominee;” (vii) a Member, “the Development Commissioner concerned;”
(viii) a Member, either a Professor from the Indian Institute of Management or the Indian
Institute of Foreign Trade; and (iix) a Member, “an officer not below the rank of Deputy
Secretary to the Government of India dealing with [SEZs] in the Ministry or Department of
the Central Government dealing with commerce. Id. §§ 8(2)(a)–8(2)(i).
95
Id. § 8(2)(e). Initially, the Central Government did not want state governments to have
any say in the approval process. However, to garner the support of the left-wing parties, the
Central Government allowed one state government nominee to be a member of the Board.
Dohrmann, supra note 14, at 66.
96
Special Economic Zones Act, § 8(6) (India).
88
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requirements must be met for approval of SEZ proposals. First, Developers
are required to meet minimum area requirements. “SEZs for multiproduct”97 must have at least 1,000 hectares.98 Similarly, “SEZs for specific
sector”99 must reserve at least 100 hectares.100 Identically, “SEZs in a port
or airport”101 must reserve at least 100 hectares.102 Second, Developers are
required to meet minimum processing area requirements. SEZs for multiproduct,103 SEZs for specific sector,104 and SEZs in a port or airport105 must
reserve at least 50% of the area for processing activities. Third, after a
meeting in September 2006, the Board placed minimum investment requirements upon Developers.106 SEZs for multi-product must show a minimum investment of `10,000,000,000 (approximately $195,465,200), or
minimum net worth of `2,500,000,000 (approximately $48,866,300). Similarly, SEZs for specific sector must show a minimum investment of
`2,500,000,000 (approximately $48,866,300), or minimum net worth of
`500,000,000 (approximately $9,773,260).107
If the Board approves a proposal, it communicates the approval to the
97
An SEZ for multi-product is an SEZ where Units may be set up for (i) manufacture of
goods falling in two or more sectors, (ii) rendering of services falling in two or more sectors,
or (iii) any combination thereof, including trading and warehousing. Special Economic
Zones (Amendment) Rules, 2009, § 2, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Feb. 3, 2009), available
at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SpecialEconomicZone%20_Amendment_
%20Rules2009.pdf.
98
Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006, § 5(2)(a), GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Feb. 10,
2006), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SEZ_Rules_July_2010.
pdf.
99
An SEZ for specific sector is an SEZ meant exclusively for one or more (i) products in
a sector, or (ii) services in a sector. Id. § 2(1)(zb).
100
Id. § 5(2)(b).
101
An SEZ in a port or airport is an SEZ existing in a port or airport for (i) manufacture
of two or more goods in a sector, (ii) manufacture of goods falling in two or more sectors,
(iii) trading and warehousing, or (iv) rendering services. Id. §2(1)(zc).
102
Id. § 5(2)(b).
103
Special Economic Zones (Second Amendment) Rules, 2007, § 2, GAZETTE OF INDIA, §
II(3)(ii) (Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/
Third_Amendment-3rd_October_2007.pdf. The original SEZ Rules required that SEZs for
multi-product must reserve only 25% of area for processing activities. Special Economic
Zones Rules, 2006 § 5(2)(a) (India). A prior amendment increased the minimum processing
area requirement for SEZs for multi-product to 35%, but permitted the Central Government
to relax the requirement to 25% on recommendation from the Board. Special Economic
Zones (Amendment) Rules, 2006, § 2, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/dated-10-8-06-amending-sezrules06
.pdf.
104
Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006, § 5(2)(b) (India).
105
Id.
106
PRESS INFO. BUREAU, LIST OF AUTHORISED ACTIVITIES IN NON-PROCESSING AREA OF
SEZS TO BE NOTIFIED annex 2 (2006) (India), available at http://pib.nic.in/archieve/others
/2006/sep06/E2006210906.pdf.
107
Id.
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Central Government.108 The Central Government must then issue a Letter
of Approval within thirty days of receiving the approval from the Board to
either the state government or private entity that submitted the proposal.109
However, issuance of a formal Letter of Approval does not automatically
make an SEZ operational.
B. Making the SEZ Operational
SEZs are made operational through a two-step process. First, the Developer must complete the land acquisition process. To complete the land
acquisition process, the Developer must produce a certificate from the state
government or another authorized agency verifying that the Developer has
legal possession and irrevocable rights to develop the land and that the land
is free from all encumbrances.110 Since the SEZ Act is silent on the land
acquisition regime to be utilized by Developers, the Land Acquisition Act
of 1894 (Land Acquisition Act), which allows acquisition of land for “public purpose” or for “a company,”111 is used to acquire land for SEZs.112 Second, Units must obtain authorization to operate within the SEZ. Authorization for various operations occurring within the SEZ is granted by the
Approval Committee.113 The Approval Committee is comprised of nine
108

Special Economic Zones Act, No. 28 of 2005, § 3(9)(a), INDIA CODE (2011), available
at http://indiacode.nic.in.
109
Special Economic Zones (Second Amendment) Rules, 2007, § 4, GAZETTE OF INDIA, §
II(3)(ii) (Mar. 16, 2007), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/sez-sndamend-rules2007.pdf.
110
Id. § 5.
111
Land Acquisition Act, No. 1 of 1894, INDIA CODE (2011), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in.
112
Dohrmann, supra note 14, at 75. See PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 105.
113
The Approval Committee may discharge the following functions:
(a) approve the import or procurement of goods from the Domestic Tariff Area, in
the Special Economic Zone for carrying on the authorised operations by a Developer; (b) approve the providing of services by a service provider, from outside India, or from the Domestic Tariff Area, for carrying on the authorised operations by
the Developer, in the Special Economic Zone; (c) monitor the utilisation of goods
or services or warehousing or trading in the Special Economic Zone; (d) approve,
modify or reject proposals for setting up Units for manufacturing or rendering services or warehousing or trading in the Special Economic Zone [other than the
grant of licence under clause (e) of sub-section (2) of section 9] in accordance with
the provisions of sub-section (8) of section 15; (e) allow, on receipt of approval
under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 9, foreign collaborations and foreign
direct investments (including investments by a person outside India) for setting up
a Unit; (f) monitor and supervise compliance of conditions subject to which the
letter of approval or permission, if any, has been granted to the Developer or entrepreneur; and (g) perform such other functions as may be entrusted to it by the
Central Government or the state government concerned, as the case may be.
Special Economic Zones Act, No. 28 of 2005, § 14(1), INDIA CODE (2011), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in.
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members.114 Most of these members are nominated by the Central Government.115 The state government where the proposed SEZ is being developed has authority to nominate only two members.116 Here, too, all the acts
of the Approval Committee are decided by a “general consensus of the
Members present.”117 The Approval Committee bases its decision to approve the operation of Units on two key elements: the Unit must achieve
positive net foreign exchange earnings,118 and the Developer must confirm
the availability of space and infrastructural support demanded by the
Unit.119
C. Incentives Offered by SEZs
Once an SEZ is operational, the Developers and Units can take advantage of the incentives offered. Developers receive fiscal incentives.
Most notably, Developers receive an exemption from payment of: (i) income tax under Section 80-IAB of the Income Tax Act of 1961 (Income
Tax Act) for ten consecutive years;120 (ii) Minimum Alternate Tax under
Section 115JB of the Income Tax Act;121 (iii) service tax under Chapter V
of the Finance Act of 1994 (Finance Act) on taxable services provided to a
Developer;122 (iv) sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act of 1956 (Central Sales Tax Act) on sale or purchase of goods;123 (v) customs duty under
the Customs Act of 1962 (Customs Act) and the Custom Tariff Act of 1975
(Custom Tariff Act) on goods imported by Developers for authorized operations;124 and (vi) excise duty under the Central Excise Act of 1944 (Central Excise Act) and Central Excise Tariff Act of 1985 (Central Excise Tar114

Id. § 13(2).
The Central Government has the authority to nominate: (i) a Chairperson, the Development Commissioner, (ii) two Members, officers of the Central Government, (iii) two
members, officers of the Central Government to represent the Ministry or Department dealing with revenue, and (iv) a Member, an officer of the Central Government to represent the
Ministry of Department dealing with economic affairs. Id. §§ 11(1), 13(2)(a)–(d).
116
Id. § 13(2)(e).
117
Id. § 13(5).
118
Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006, § 53, GAZETTE OF INDIA, § II(3)(i) (Feb. 10,
2006), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/SEZ_Rules_July_2010
.pdf.
119
Id. § 18(2)(ii).
120
Special Economic Zones Act, at Second Schedule (Modifications to the Income Tax
Act of 1961), §(f)(2) (India). A Developer can only receive the income tax exemption for
ten consecutive years within fifteen years from the date of commencement of operations in
the SEZ. Id.
121
Id. at Second Schedule (Modifications to the Income Tax Act of 1961), §(h). This tax
is levied on companies on the basis of their “book profits” at 7.5%. PALIT &
BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 146.
122
Special Economic Zones Act § 26(1)(e) (India).
123
Id. § 26(1)(g).
124
Id. § 26(1)(a).
115
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iff Act).125 Additionally, state governments are given the freedom to enact
any legislation granting Developers exemption from any state taxes, duties,
or levies.126
Similarly, Units also receive a set of incentives. First, Units receive
fiscal benefits. Most notably, Units receive an exemption from payment of:
(i) income tax under Section 10AA of the Income Tax Act;127 (ii) service
tax under Chapter V of the Finance Act on taxable services provided to a
Unit;128 (iii) sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act on sale or purchase of
goods;129 (v) customs duty under the Customs Act and the Custom Tariff
Act on goods imported and exported by Units for authorized operations;130
(vi) excise duty under the Central Excise Act and Central Excise Tariff
Act;131 and (vii) capital gains tax during transfer of assets involved in shifting from urban areas to SEZs.132 Additionally, state governments are given
the freedom to enact any legislation granting Units exemption from any
state taxes, duties, or levies.133 Second, SEZs provide Units with possible
relief from India’s restrictive labor laws.134 While SEZ regulation does not
overtly exempt Units from labor laws,135 the SEZ Rules empower the Development Commissioner to “step up with a firm hand in industrial disputes” with a view to continue operations.136 Third, SEZs equip Units with
125

Id. § 26(1)(c).
Id. § 50(a).
127
Id. at Second Schedule (Modifications to the Income Tax Act of 1961), §(c)(1). For
the first five years from commencement of operations, the Unit is exempt from paying income tax on 100% of export profits. For the next five years, the Unit is exempt from paying
income tax on 50% of export profits. For the next five years, the Unit may deduct 50% of
retained export profits from its income tax liability. Id.
128
Id. § 26(1)(e).
129
Id. § 26(1)(g).
130
Id. § 26(1)(a)–(b).
131
Id. § 26(1)(c).
132
Id. at Second Schedule (Modifications to the Income Tax Act of 1961), §(d)(1). This
exemption on capital gains tax requires that one year before or three years after the transfer,
the Unit (i) purchased machinery or plant for operations in the SEZ, (ii) acquired land or
building or constructed building for operations in the SEZ, (iii) shifted the original asset and
transferred establishment of such undertaking to the SEZ, and (iv) incurred expenses on certain authorized purposes. Id.
133
Id. § 50(a).
134
PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 131.
135
The SEZ Act does not allow modifications to any of India’s Central Acts or Rules regarding trade unions, industrial and labor disputes, welfare of labor, conditions of work,
provident funds, employers’ liability, workers’ compensation, and maternity benefits. Special Economic Zones Act, § 49(1) (India). Thus, India’s labor laws “clearly” remain intact in
SEZs. PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 131.
136
PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 131. The SEZ Rules empower the Development Commissioner to declare SEZs as public utility services under the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006, § (5)(g), GAZETTE OF INDIA, §
II(3)(i) (Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/rules/
126
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modern and convenient “plug and play” infrastructure.137
III. DEBATE SURROUNDING SEZS
Much of the debate about the viability of SEZs in India is rooted in the
operational framework of SEZs. Pointing to benefits generated by SEZs,
proponents of India’s SEZ policy lend support to several legislative and
regulatory provisions. Conversely, opponents of the SEZ policy make
compelling arguments that legislative and regulatory shortcomings render
the SEZ policy injurious to the national economy.
A. Proponents’ Assertions in Favor of SEZs
Proponents of India’s SEZ policy base their support on three economic
predictions that have been witnessed in SEZs internationally.138 First, SEZs
efficiently attract FDI. Additionally, SEZs promote infrastructural development. Finally, SEZs create employment.
1. SEZs Attract FDI
SEZs are considered “ideal” for attracting FDI.139 The incentives
SEZs offer to Developers and Units elicit investment from foreign sources.
As described in the operational framework section above, Developers re-

SEZ_Rules_July_2010.pdf. The Industrial Disputes Act prohibits conditions for strikes and
lock-outs on employees of public utilities. Industrial Disputes Act, No. 14 of 1947, §22,
INDIA CODE (2011) available at http://indiacode.nic.in. Thus, by being declared as public
utilities, SEZs will be shielded from strikes and lock-outs.
137
Nachammai Raman, India Tries to Tame its Red-Tape Jungle, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Jun. 16, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0616/p01s04-wosc.htm (readily
available “plug and play” infrastructure allows expedited and cost-effective establishment of
Units).
138
See PRESS INFO. BUREAU, supra note 106 (predicting that SEZs would “trigger a large
flow of foreign direct investment as well as domestic investment in infrastructure and productive capacity leading to creation of new employment opportunities”); see also Herbert
Jaunch, The Case of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in Namibia, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 82, at 177; Vijaya Katti & Arpita Subhash, SEZ; Case of Mauritius EPZ, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN
EXPERIENCES, supra note 82, at 151; Tatsuyuki Ota, Special Economic Zones in China’s
Economic Development as Compared with Asian Export Processing Zones, in SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 82, at 71; Anandan Pillai &
Pheba Anandan Pillai, Shenzhen SEZ; Role Model for Emerging SEZs, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 82, at 134; Pheba Anandan Pillai,
Comparative Study of Exports Processing Zones’ Performance: India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 82, at
106; Vandana Singh, Jebel Ali Free Trade Zone: An Oasis in Desert, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 82, at 169.
139
PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 7. Typically, FDI is accompanied with
advanced technology. Id. at 8. Thus, as linkages develop between the SEZ and urban areas,
technology is transferred to urban areas. Id.
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ceive a variety of fiscal benefits.140 As additionally explained above, Units
receive fiscal benefits, relief from India’s restrictive labor laws, and established infrastructure.141 Adoption of such free market principles in SEZs
attracts FDI.142 Empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. Total FDI inflow into SEZs as of March 2008 was `54,900,410,000 (approximately
$1,073,112,000).143 Additionally, proposed FDI inflow into SEZs was
`322,273,600,000 (approximately $6,299,327,600).144 These actual and
proposed FDI inflows are evidence of SEZs’ ability to attract FDI.
2. SEZs Promote Infrastructure Development
SEZs are recognized as “potent instruments for building infrastructure.”145 By offering fiscal incentives in SEZs, “governments expect private
Developers to come forward for building infrastructure.”146 Two provisions
in the operational framework ensure that SEZs will generate such infrastructural benefits for the Indian economy.147 First, minimum processing
area requirements compel Developers to build infrastructure on some portion of the land occupied by the SEZ.148 Second, minimum investment re-

140

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.C.
142
See Sumeet Jain, Note, Tightening India’s “Golden Straitjacket”: How Pulling the
Straps of India’s Job Reservation Scheme Reflects Prudent Economic Policy, 8 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 567, 567 (2009) (“The ‘Golden Straitjacket,’ a set of free market policies implemented by national governments, is golden because it attracts foreign investors,
and is a straitjacket because deviation from it will repel foreign investors.”). See also
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 89 (1999).
143
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUS., INVESTMENT PROPOSED
AND MADE IN SEZS NOTIFIED UNDER SEZ ACT AS OF 31.3.2008 (2008) (India) [hereinafter
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUS.], available at http://
www.nsez.gov.in/nsezwebsite/Resources/Employemnt/investment-proposed-and-made-insez-notified-under-to-SEZs.pdf.
Of this total FDI, Units have accounted for
`29,099,710,000 (approximately $568,798,0000) and Developers have accounted for
`25,800,700,000 (approximately $504,313,920). Id.
144
Id. Of this total proposed FDI inflow, Units have accounted for `111,485,000,000
(approximately $2,179,143,860) and Developers have accounted for `210,788,600,000 (approximately $4,120,183,740). Id.
145
PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 175. However, it is important to understand that “SEZs are not instruments for developing backward areas.” Id. at 173. In fact,
“poor locational choices can have disastrous outcomes for these zones.” Id. Therefore, “it is
naïve to assume that generous fiscal incentives will help in overcoming the heavy transaction
costs of operating in far-flung remote corners of the country.” Id.
146
PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 8. As linkages begin to develop between
the SEZs and urban areas, infrastructural developments are also expected to occur outside
the zonal boundaries. Id.
147
See ARUNACHALAM, supra note 58, at 21 (predicting that SEZs in India will “offer
high quality infrastructural facilities and support services”).
148
See supra text accompanying notes 103–105.
141
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quirements induce Developers to invest in infrastructure.149 By requiring
Developers to meet certain area and financial thresholds regarding development of infrastructure, these two stipulations ensure that a significant
fraction of total investment made in SEZs is devoted to infrastructure.
Since total investment in SEZs as of March 2008 amounted to a healthy
`693,495,730,000 (approximately $13,555,428,650),150 India’s SEZ policy
is expected to bear sizeable investment in infrastructure.
3. SEZs Create Employment
SEZs are noted for their ability to create new employment opportunities.151 For India, a country with a labor surplus, such employment creation
is a policy priority.152 SEZs have a dualistic employment generation effect.
SEZs create direct employment for individuals employed in Units operating
within the SEZ.153 As of March 2008, SEZs had directly employed 97,993
individuals154 and proposed direct employment was 2,448,246.155 What is
more, SEZs create indirect employment for individuals engaged in industries and services which support the activity within SEZs, such as trucking
of goods to SEZs.156 As of March 2008, SEZs had indirectly employed
220,506 individuals and proposed indirect employment was 2,455,196.157
In all, SEZs have generated substantial employment and are predicted to
continue generating employment in increasing amounts.
B. Opponents’ Arguments Against SEZs
Opponents of India’s SEZ policy base their contentions on three unwanted consequences of the policy. First, SEZ development leads to unjust
and inequitable seizure of agrarian land. Second, land acquisition for SEZs
promotes underhanded real estate dealing. Lastly, the Indian government
will suffer a net financial loss on the SEZ policy.
149

See supra text accompanying notes 106–107.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUS., supra note 143. Total
investment includes FDI and total domestic investment.
151
PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 7. The “employment benefits are particularly strong if the zones promote activities utilizing relatively low-skilled labour, since the
latter not only comprise bigger chinks of developing economy workforces, but also figure
dominantly among the poor.” Id. However, there are examples of workers being trained for
upgrading their skills. Id. at 8. Thus, SEZs may also contribute to skills development.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 7.
154
See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUS., EMPLOYMENT IN SEZS
NOTIFIED AFTER SEZ ACT, 2005 AS OF 31.3.2008 (2008) (India) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT IN
SEZS], available at http://www.nsez.gov.in /nsezwebsite/Resources/Employemnt/Emp-inGovt-State-private-established-prior-to-SEZs.pdf.
155
Id.
156
PALIT & BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 13, at 7.
157
EMPLOYMENT IN SEZS, supra note 154.
150
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1. SEZs Displace Agrarian Communities
In a largely agrarian economy,158 it is no surprise that the staunchest
critics of SEZ policy are those defending the “sacred tie between the tiller
and the land.”159 Given that agrarian viewpoints were excluded from the
development of SEZ policy, it is even less of a surprise that agrarian grievances are the fiercest criticisms of the SEZ policy.160 Agrarian communities
object to SEZs for fear of displacement. Displacement has two components. First, agrarian communities are losing their land to Developers at
prices “well below” prevailing market rates.161 Second, along with losing
their land, these communities lose their livelihoods.162 Ultimately, displacement of agrarian communities banishes them to irrecoverable poverty.
Due to predicted mass displacement of agrarian communities, India’s
SEZ policy has been called “one of the greatest land grabs in modern Indian
history.”163 As of September 2010, SEZ development is set to occupy approximately 94,000 hectares.164 Total cultivable land area165 at the inception of SEZ policy in India in 2005 was approximately 182,570,000 hectares.166 While current SEZ development threatens only 0.05% of total
cultivable land in India, it is estimated that this land acquisition will displace 1,000,000 individuals.167 Accordingly, agrarian resistance to SEZs is
158

The World Factbook—India, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov
/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (The agricultural sector accounts for 18.5% of India’s GDP.). See also ARUNACHALAM, supra note
58, at 221 (The agricultural sector accounts for 56.7% of the country’s workforce.).
159
ARUNACHALAM, supra note 58, at 219.
160
Id. at 220.
161
Id.; see also Karishma Vaswani, Anger over India’s Special Economic Zones, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2006, 10:57 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6054754.stm (Facing
the prospect of losing his farmland at substandard market prices to Developers, Sadhu Pingre
Dashrath, a farmer for over 40 years, explains, “[t]hey want to steal it at a fraction of the cost
it’s worth.”).
162
Sriram Ananthanarayanan, New Mechanisms of Imperialism in India: The Special
Economic Zones, 22 SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 35, 51 (2008) (“Some estimates show that
there will be only one job created for every four taken away.”).
163
ARUNACHALAM, supra note 58, at 226.
164
List of Formal SEZ Approvals Granted, supra note 74 (As of September 2010, 63,684
hectares had been granted to formally approved SEZs.). See also List of In-Principal SEZ
Approvals Granted, supra note 75 (As of September 2010, 30,402 hectares had been granted
to SEZs that had received in-principal approval).
165
Cultivable land “consists of net area sown, current fallows, fallow lands other than
current fallows, culturable waste and land under miscellaneous tree crops.” DEP’T OF AGRIC.
& COOPERATION, MINISTRY OF AGRIC. CONCEPTS & DEFINITIONS 3 (India), available at
http://eands.dacnet.nic.in/PDF_LUS/Concepts_&_Definitions.pdf (last visited Nov. 30,
2011).
166
India Cultivable Land Falls Marginally, FIN. EXPRESS (Mar. 10, 2008, 3:48 PM),
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/indias-cultivable-land-fallsmarginally /282603.
167
Devinder Sharma & Bhaskar Goswami, The New Maharajas of India,
COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG (Dec. 17, 2006), http://www.countercurrents.org/gl-sharma171206

22

“You Say Nano, We Say No-No”
32:1 (2011)

rooted in the reality that even a de minimis impact on the amount of cultivable land “is likely to have a deleterious effect on a large number of people.” 168
The current SEZ land acquisition scheme, governed by the heavyhanded terms of the Land Acquisition Act,169 shoulders the blame for the
displacement of these agrarian communities. Promulgated during the colonial era, the Land Acquisition Act retains principles of forcible land seizure
used under British rule.170 Thus, a transaction under the Land Acquisition
Act often grants a favorable deal to the acquirer and coerces the seller into
an unfavorable one.171 Once the government decides that a tract of land is
needed for “public purpose” or for “a company,” the owner of that land is
forced in most cases to accept subpar government-determined monetary
compensation in exchange for his or her land.172 Government-determined
.htm.
168
Ananthanarayanan, supra note 162, at 53. It is feared India’s SEZ policy will recreate
“a scene from a Jetson’s comic, with one part of the country living in growth bubbles high
above the ground, while below will be the teeming masses, hungry and seething that they are
not part of that growth.” Manjeet Kripalani, Townships vs. Naxalism: Which India Will
Win?, BUS. WK. (May 9, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/eyeonasia/
archives/2008/05/townships_vs_na.html.
169
See supra text accompanying notes 111–112.
170
Kannan Kasturi, SEZs: A History of Injustice and Abuse, INDIA TOGETHER (Oct. 1,
2007), http://www.indiatogether.org/2007/oct/eco-sezhist.htm. The Land Acquisition Act
was framed with the purpose of legitimizing the colonial British government’s quick, easy,
and cheap seizure of land. Id.; see also Land Acquisition Act §4, No. 1 of 1894, INDIA CODE
(2011), available at http://indiacode.nic.in (the Land Acquisition Act permitted the Indian
government to acquire land for “public purpose”). To further quick, easy, and cheap seizure
of land, “public purpose” was left undefined. Kasturi, supra. Instead, it was sufficient for
the government to simply declare “public purpose.” Id. The end of colonial rule did not
bring any significant change to India’s land acquisition laws. Id. In fact, during the Nehruvian period, the breadth of government land acquisition increased. Id. To promote Nehru’s industrialization efforts, land was increasingly being acquired for private industry. In
the landmark judgment of R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1962) 2 S.C.R. Supl. 149
(India), the Supreme Court sought to curtail this broadening of land acquisition for public
purpose. The Supreme Court held, “[the Land Acquisition Act did not contemplate] that the
Government should be made a general agent for companies to acquire lands for them in order that the owners of companies may be able to carry on their activities for private profit.”
Id. However, the legislature promptly reversed this judicial holding; the 1962 Amendment
to the Land Acquisition Act allowed the government additionally to acquire land for a company. Kasturi, supra.
171
Kasturi, supra note 170.
172
Once a tract of land appears to the appropriate government to be needed for a “public
purpose” or for “a company,” the government may send an officer to conduct a preliminary
investigation into the area, survey, and value of the land. Land Acquisition Act, § 4 (India).
Once a tract of land is declared to be needed for a “public purpose” or for “a company” after
completion of the preliminary investigation, the appropriate government shall direct a Collector to take order for acquisition of the land. Id. § 7. Where applicable, the Collector shall
hear objections over the area, survey, or value of the land to the Collector. Id. § 11. However, the Collector’s final assessment into the area, survey, and value of the land overrides any
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monetary compensation is almost always well below the prevailing market
rate.173 The result of such transactions forces agrarian communities into a
disadvantageous position.174
The fact that SEZs are primarily being established on agricultural land
intensifies the displacement of agrarian communities. In principle, SEZs
can be situated on non-agricultural land. However, infrastructure in India is
clustered around agricultural land. Therefore, establishing SEZs on nonagricultural land would require a “massive private investment in infrastructure.”175 In avoiding this investment in new infrastructure by instead establishing SEZs on agricultural land, Developers have been accused of “piggyback[ing] off the existing infrastructure—roads, power, water supply—
assiduously created for agriculture via public investment over the six decades since independence.”176
Opponents argue that the land acquisition scheme of India’s SEZ policy violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India.177 Article 21 declares
that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” 178 In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp.,179 the Supreme Court of India found that the right to life
enumerated under Article 21 encompasses the right to livelihood.180 In coercing agrarian communities to sell their land, the Land Acquisition Act
strips these communities of their means of livelihood. Therefore, opponents accuse the SEZ policy of depriving agrarian communities of their
right to livelihood implicitly contained in Article 21 of India’s Constitution.

objections. Id.
173
ARUNACHALAM, supra note 58, at 225. That recorded transactions invariably undervalue real market rates in India’s land black market only exacerbates the discrepancy between the government-determined monetary compensation and prevailing market value.
Kasturi, supra note 170.
174
ARUNACHALAM, supra note 58, at 226. The displacement of agrarian communities is
especially worrisome, as India has historically failed to provide resettlement to displaced
persons. Id. at 228.
175
Aseem Shrivastava, SEZs: The Problem, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG (Feb. 19, 2008),
http://www.countercurrents.org/shrivastava190208.htm.
176
Id.
177
People’s Memorandum on SEZs in India, supra note 12.
178
INDIA CONST. art. 21.
179
(1985) 2 S.C.R. Supl. 51 (India).
180
Id. In Olga Tellis, some pavement and slum dwellers in Bombay challenged the decision of the State of Maharashtra and Bombay Municipal Corporation to forcibly evict them.
The petitioners’ main argument was that the forcible eviction deprived them of their right to
livelihood, which is “comprehended in” the right to life contained in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court agreed with petitioners’ argument. The Court explained, “[t]he right to live and the right to work are integrated and inter-dependent and,
therefore, if a person is deprived of his job as a result of his eviction from a slum or a pavement, his very right to life is put in jeopardy.” Id. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the
right to life contained in Article 21 does indeed encompass the right to livelihood.
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2. SEZs Bring About Underhanded Real Estate Dealings
Lax land utilization requirements make the SEZ policy susceptible to
underhanded real estate dealings. As described in the operational framework section above, in exchange for procuring cheap land under the SEZ
policy, Developers of various types of SEZs are required to reserve 50% of
total area for processing activities.181 Once the minimum area for processing has been reserved, Developers may utilize the remainder of the area
for property development. Many suspect that these lax minimum processing area requirements encourage property dealings under the guise of
SEZ dealings—Developers hoping to acquire cheap land need simply meet
the minimum processing area requirements then lease182 the remaining land
at highly profitable rates to make significant profits.183 Early empirical evidence supports this suspicion. Noida, an SEZ outside Delhi, has witnessed
real estate speculation caused by spiraling land prices.184 This trend in land
prices fuels speculation that Developers are earning profits upwards of
10,000% through underhanded real estate dealings.185
3. SEZs Inflict a Financial Loss on Government
Easily attainable eligibility requirements for Units create a perverse incentive for business units to cause a decrease in India’s fiscal revenue by
relocating from tax-paying urban areas to tax-free SEZs without adequate
repayment in the form of additional FDI. As explained in the operational
framework section above, the SEZ Rules require only that a Unit achieve
positive net foreign exchange earnings, rather than meeting an export target.186 This readily attainable requirement creates a perverse incentive for
business units to relocate from urban areas to SEZs.187 Rahul Bajaj, chairman of the Bajaj Group, one of India’s largest business conglomerates,
agrees that “any rational businessman would conclude he is better off being

181

See supra text accompanying notes 103–105.
The Special Economic Zones Act, No. 28 of 2005, §11(9), INDIA CODE (2011), available at http://indiacode.nic.in (Developers are not allowed to sell land in an SEZ).
183
See Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, SEZs: The Good, Bad and Ugly, ECON. TIMES,
(Aug. 30, 2006, 1:22 AM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/article show/msid1937596,prtpage-1.cms. Some governmental entities seem to share the suspicion that the
SEZ policy encourages disguised property dealings. First, the Central Bank classifies loans
to SEZs as “real estate” lending. Id. Second, former Finance Minister P. Chidambaram
“obliquely hinted” that SEZs had more to do with real estate than industrial development.
ARUNACHALAM, supra note 58, at 224.
184
Ananthanaryanan, supra note 162, at 50.
185
Shrivastava, supra note 175.
186
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
187
See Cash Cows, supra note 1. Even Rahul Bajaj, chairman of Bajaj Auto, a premier
Indian business conglomerate planning to manufacture in an SEZ, admits that this lax target
is “too generous.” Id. at 46.
182
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in a [sic] SEZ.”188 Since Units need only achieve positive net foreign exchange earnings, these Units, upon meeting their meager foreign exchange
targets, may continue supplying domestic markets.189 The final result is that
the Indian government incurs a net financial loss on the SEZ plan by sustaining greater losses to tax revenue than gains to FDI. In fact, empirical
evidence supports this hypothesis. The Central Board of Excise and Customs has estimated that, as of January 2010, India had suffered revenue
losses because of SEZs of `1,750,000,000,000 (approximately
$34,206,411,260).190 A collaboration of various Indian government ministries and departments, in turn, has determined that the total FDI inflow into
SEZs as of the end of 2009 was only approximately `112,000,000,000
($2.29 billion).191 Given that some of this FDI may have been diverted
from urban areas to SEZs, the net loss incurred by the government through
the SEZ plan might be larger than these figures indicate.
IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS TO THE SEZ POLICY
An examination of the proponents’ arguments demonstrates that SEZs
hold potential to be valuable instruments of economic growth and development in India. However, the resistance arising from the opponents’ concerns limits this potential. Since much of the resistance facing SEZs stems
from the operational framework’s inability to address opponent interests,
legislative and regulatory reforms that make the SEZ policy widely agreeable are necessary for its success. Such consensus-building reforms will be
best designed by applying regulatory negotiation, a process in which representatives of affected parties collectively develop rules and regulations.
The most significant advantage offered by regulatory negotiation is the
“legitimacy benefit.”192 Regulations that have been developed through negotiation earn greater procedural and substantive legitimacy. Procedurally,
a regulation is more likely to earn widespread legitimacy when a greater
proportion of affected constituents are involved in the process of designing
the regulation. The mere act of participating in the design of a regulation
reduces a party’s will and ability to attack or resist that regulation.193 In188

Id.
Id.
190
Manshi Asher, Five Years After SEZs: Chronicle of Revenues Forgone, INFOCHANGE
(Dec. 2010), http://infochangeindia.org/governance/analysis/five-years-after-sezs-chronicleof-revenues-forgone.html.
191
Special Economic Zones, NAT’L PORTAL OF INDIA (Jan. 11, 2011), http://india.gov.in/
sectors/commerce/index.php?id=13.
192
Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENV. LAW J. 60, 63 (2000).
193
Neil Eisner, Regulatory Negotiation: A Real World Experience, 31 FED. BAR NEWS J.
371, 373 (1984).
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Participation in the process would let everyone see how difficult it is to draft a
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deed, “regardless of whether the horse under design turns out to be a fivelegged camel or a Kentucky Derby winner, the resulting rule would have a
validity” unachievable through regulation that was not negotiated.194 Substantively, a regulation is more likely to earn widespread legitimacy when it
is better informed and balanced. First, the representation of affected constituents facilitates more holistic fact collection.195 In regulation that was
not negotiated, authorities primarily rely on theoretical information.196 In
contrast, negotiated regulation allows constituents to present supplemental
empirical information.197 Such holistic fact collection, in turn, leads to the
creation of more informed regulations. Second, the representation of affected constituents reveals the true interests of the parties. Regulatory negotiation offers a unique opportunity for constituents to maximize their respective interests by prioritizing interests and making concessions.198 A
centralized regulatory authority often makes ill-judged concessions, because
it is unaware of the constituents’ prioritization of interests.199 Regulatory
negotiation avoids this pitfall by allowing “careful tradeoffs necessary for
an enlightened regulation.”200 Thus, a more transparent view of the constituents’ interests offers the possibility of more balanced regulations. More
substantively informed and balanced regulation, as is promised through
regulatory negotiation, is less likely to be objectionable. The legitimacy
benefit of regulatory negotiation is derived from this procedural and substantive acceptance.
It is neither feasible nor prudent to repeal the existing SEZ policy, engage in regulatory negotiation, and reinstate a new SEZ policy. Nevertheless, it is both feasible and prudent to amend the current SEZ policy to retroactively reflect a more negotiation-based approach. In line with the
regulatory negotiation approach, this article suggests two sets of legislative
and regulatory reforms. The first set of reforms—procedural reforms—
focuses on securing greater opponent involvement in the establishment and
operation of SEZs. The second set of reforms—substantive reforms—

rule, especially on a controversial subject. Even if the parties did not reach a consensus, they would be less likely to attack a rule issued by the agency. Indeed, if
the parties could not reach a consensus, it would be difficult for them to complain
that they could do a better job than the agency.
Id.
194
Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 31
(1982–83).
195
Eisner, supra note 193, at 373 (“Because of the representation of each affected interest, it should be easier for the agency to gather the necessary factual support for its rulemaking.”).
196
See Harter, supra note 194, at 30.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 7.
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focuses on introducing rules that will further opponent interests through, not
despite, the establishment and operation of SEZs. Admittedly many of these suggested reforms diminish the economic incentives investors will experience in SEZs. However, this reduction in incentives is a necessary compromise to eliminate the more burdensome social barriers and legislative
and regulatory uncertainty generated by the widespread protests facing
SEZs.
A. Procedural Reforms
Quelling the popular resistance facing SEZs hinges largely on the implementation of legislative and regulatory reforms that would facilitate
greater participation of opponents in the establishment and operation of
SEZs. First, state governments should exercise greater control over the
Board. Second, the Board should engage in a case-by-case determination of
minimum processing area requirements for prospective SEZs. Together,
these procedural measures ensure the involvement of affected state constituents in the establishment and operation of an SEZ. Furthermore, these
measures act as a safety valve, providing state constituents the tools to balance the advantages promised by SEZs against the harm done through displacement of agrarian communities and underhanded real estate dealings.
1. Greater State Government Control over the Board
To address opponents’ concerns over the displacement of agrarian
communities,201 state governments should have more control over the
Board, the body regulating the establishment and operation of SEZs.202 Insufficient state authority in the establishment and operation of SEZs has
been listed as a factor for SEZs’ underperformance.203 Thus, increasing
state governments’ authority in this area is necessary to improve the performance of SEZs.
Currently, the distribution of authority between the Central Government and state governments in establishing and operating SEZs is inversely
related to the stake each government has in the enterprise. The Central
Government has less of a stake than state governments in the establishment
and operation of an SEZ. First, because the employment, FDI, and infrastructural benefits of SEZs occur directly within the state, a state government benefits more than the Central Government from the successful establishment and operation of the SEZ. Second, because resistance to a
particular SEZ is typically localized, a state government stands to lose more
than the Central Government from the establishment and operation of un201

See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra text accompanying note 87.
203
See Prabha Shashtri Ranade, Special Economic Zones: An Overview, in SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONES: GLOBAL AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 83, at 3, 17.
202
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wanted SEZs. Yet, the Central Government is able to exert more authority
than is a state government in the establishment and operation of SEZs, because the majority of the members on the Board are nominated by the Central Government.204 Therefore, although the Central Government stands to
gain and lose less through SEZs than do state governments, the Central
Government holds more authority than state governments in establishing
and operating the SEZ.
Instead, authority between the Central Government and state governments in establishing and operating SEZs should be redistributed to reflect
the stake each government holds. Redistributing authority requires changing the composition of the Board to include more state government nominees than Central Government nominees. Allowing state governments to
control decisions of the Board should lead to the establishment and operation of a greater proportion of successful SEZs. When deciding to establish
and operate an SEZ, state governments will be more likely than the Central
Government to accurately balance the benefits to employment, FDI, and infrastructure against the harm of popular resistance. State governments have
an incentive to accrue employment, FDI, and infrastructural benefits. But,
this incentive is counterbalanced by state governments’ incentive to cater to
the views of their electorates. This competing set of interests induces a
more precise cost-benefit analysis over the establishment and operation of
an SEZ. A more accurate analysis should generate a greater proportion of
popularly-supported SEZs.
2. Case-by-Case Determination of Minimum Processing Area
Requirements
To address opponents’ concerns over the occurrence of underhanded
real estate dealings under the guise of SEZ dealings,205 a case-by-case determination of land utilization requirements should supplement existing
minimum processing area requirements. The current land utilization requirements—the lax minimum processing area requirements discussed in
the operational framework section above206—leave the SEZ policy susceptible to underhanded real estate dealings. Thus, there is a need for more
stringent land utilization requirements. However, to avoid undue hardship
that would result from across-the-board increases in the minimum requirements, case-by-case determinations are required.
Indiscriminately increasing minimum processing area requirements for
all SEZs will be unduly burdensome upon many Developers. For example,
Mukesh Ambani, a prominent Developer, will be unable to develop viable
SEZs if more stringent minimum processing area requirements are imposed.
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He explains that to remain competitive with SEZs in Dubai and China in
attracting international business units, he must offer comparable lease terms
on the industrial processing area.207 Offering comparable lease terms to the
SEZs in Dubai and China forces Mr. Ambani, in turn, to incur a loss on the
industrial processing area.208 Therefore, Mr. Ambani does not derive his
financial incentive to develop SEZs from leasing the industrial processing
area. Rather, Mr. Ambani derives his financial incentive to develop SEZs
from leasing the non-processing residential area.209 Thus, imposing higher
minimum processing area requirements for all SEZs will extinguish the financial incentive for Developers like Mr. Ambani.
Instead, a more nuanced system of imposing minimum processing area
requirements is necessary. Accordingly, a case-by-case determination of
minimum processing area requirements will be an effective means of imposing more stringent land utilization requirements. Under this system, upper limits for minimum processing area requirements in each type of SEZ
would be introduced. A Developer would bear the burden of proposing reasons for being exempted from this upper limit. Upon reviewing the Developer’s proposal, the Board would have the freedom to impose a less stringent minimum processing area requirement. In making this determination,
the Board would examine the profitability of the SEZ’s processing area: the
more profitable the non-processing area in comparison to the processing area, the lower would be the minimum processing area requirements. Critically, however, the Board would not have the freedom to reduce the minimum processing area requirements below existing levels. A policy in
which SEZs are by default required to meet stricter land utilization requirements will reduce the scope for underhanded real estate dealings. At
the same time, to avoid undue hardship on particular SEZs, case-by-case
determinations will provide exemptions from this stricter requirement.
B. Substantive Reforms
To effectively reduce popular resistance against India’s SEZs, procedural reforms must necessarily be complemented by substantive reforms
that transform the SEZ policy into a mutually beneficial initiative. To
achieve such acceptance, substantive reforms must take the shape of rules
that promote opponents’ interests. To reverse the pressing fear that SEZs
will displace agrarian communities, employment targets should be imposed
upon Units, and the inclusion of previous landowners in SEZs’ development and operation should be incentivized. Additionally, to diffuse the
concern that SEZs will result in financial losses for the government, export
targets should be imposed upon Units. This set of substantive safeguards
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transforms India’s SEZ policy into an initiative that also promotes its opponents’ interests.
1. Employment Targets for Units
To remedy the displacement of agrarian communities,210 employment
targets should be imposed upon Units. Employment targets will reduce
displacement of agrarian communities by relieving the second component
of displacement—the loss of livelihoods.211 Thus, the imposition of employment generation targets upon Units would partly address popular protests provoked by the loss of livelihoods. In fact, rather than merely quelling the hostility against SEZs, providing employment benefits to agrarian
communities may even provide a positive incentive for these communities
to facilitate the establishment of SEZs.
One effective scheme for imposing employment targets upon Units
could be a point scheme modeled upon the Black Economic Empowerment
(BEE) initiative in South Africa.212 Under such a scheme, Units would be
required to meet a minimum “Community Employment” points threshold to
be eligible to operate in an SEZ. Each Unit would accrue points for taking
various employment-related measures. For example, Units would accrue
points for employing individuals from local agrarian communities, and
could earn additional points for involving these employees in management
and for developing these employees’ skills.213 Under this scheme, Units
would have flexibility in deciding which employment-related measures to
implement to meet the minimum “Community Employment” points thresh-
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old. Thus, this point scheme will contribute to the employment welfare of
individuals from local agrarian communities, without imposing rigid employment-related requirements that would repel investors.
2. Incentivizing the Inclusion of Previous Landowners in SEZ
Development and Operation
To further remedy the displacement of agrarian communities cited by
opponents,214 the SEZ land acquisition scheme should be transformed to incentivize the inclusion of previous landowners in the development and operation of SEZs. As expressed in opponents’ views, the current SEZ land
acquisition scheme, governed by the heavy-handed terms of the Land Acquisition Act, makes little progress in including previous landowners as
beneficiaries of SEZs.215 Replacing the current SEZ land acquisition regime216 with a land acquisition regime that converts previous landowners
into stakeholders in the emerging SEZ development will alleviate the displacement of agrarian communities. Remarkably, this idea has received
support from both ends of the political spectrum.217 An inclusive SEZ land
acquisition scheme could take the form of a point system for Developers or
of a fractional land return system.
a. Point System for Developers
An inclusive SEZ land acquisition scheme could take the form of a
point system for Developers modeled upon the BEE initiative in South Africa.218 This point scheme for Developers is similar to the point scheme
suggested above for Units. Under such a scheme, Developers would be required to meet a minimum “Community Inclusivity” points threshold to be
eligible to operate in an SEZ. Developers would accrue points for taking
various measures that include previous landowners in the development and
operation of the SEZ, such as employing these previous landowners, involving them in management, and extending equity ownership to them.
This point system for Developers addresses both components of dis-
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placement: inadequate compensation for land and the loss of livelihoods.219
First, by providing an alternative ownership interest, extending equity ownership in SEZs to previous landowners partially rectifies the inadequate
compensation received for land. Second, providing employment opportunities will prevent the loss of livelihoods. Extending equity ownership provides the additional benefit of arming previous landowners with an active
interest in the success of an SEZ. To ensure that previous landowners
maintain an active interest in the success of SEZs, Developers should be
unable to meet the minimum points threshold without extending significant
equity ownership to previous landowners.
b. Fractional Land Return System
Alternatively, an inclusive SEZ land acquisition scheme could be
based upon a fractional land return system. Under this system, once an SEZ
has been developed, Developers will be required to return a certain fraction
of the developed land to the previous landowners.220 This system functions
on the premise that land in an SEZ is far more valuable than agricultural
land. Accordingly, although the Developer returns only a fraction of the
SEZ land to the previous landowner, the value of the returned land in the
SEZ is expected to exceed the value of the larger agricultural land acquired
prior to the development of the SEZ. Thus, the expectation is that both the
Developer and the previous owners of the SEZ land will benefit from the
development of the SEZ. By providing previous landowners with land
more valuable than what they previously owned, the fractional land return
system addresses the first component of displacement—inadequate compensation for land.221 Even more, because the previous landowners will
have an interest in the land in the SEZ, they will have an incentive to maximize the value of that land by making the SEZ successful.
3. Export Targets for Units
To mitigate the financial loss incurred by the Government on the SEZ
policy,222 Units should be subject to meeting export targets. The current
SEZ operational framework requires only that Units achieve positive net
foreign exchange earnings.223 However, to ensure that the fiscal benefits
available within SEZs are availed of only by Units providing adequate repayment in the form of additional FDI, the net foreign exchange target
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should be replaced with an export target. An export target would require
that Units export a significant proportion of their total output. Since meeting an export target places burdens upon a non-exporting business unit, the
perverse incentive for business units to relocate from urban areas to SEZs is
vitiated. Thus, the Indian economy would be less likely to experience a reduction in fiscal revenue without a corresponding gain in FDI.
CONCLUSION
SEZs have developed into “possibly the toughest challenge” that Indian policy-makers have faced.224 On one hand, the potential benefits that
SEZs promise are vital to India’s developing economy. On the other hand,
pushing India’s current SEZ mandate against the popular resistance it faces
bears the risk of dismantling the SEZ policy altogether. Yet, opinions on
SEZs need not be so polarized.
With consensus-building reforms, SEZs are capable of delivering a
positive-sum outcome. By employing several of the reforms suggested in
this article at a micro level and in an informal manner, Navin Raheja, a Developer, smoothly earned approval for his SEZ.225 Understanding the general proposition that earning popular approval is critical to the success of
his SEZ, Raheja hired a local advertising agency to make educational and
inspirational movies about the SEZ.226 Further, parallel to the suggestion of
incorporating local concerns when deliberating SEZ proposals by replacing
the Central Board of Approval with a State Board of Approval,227 Raheja
acquired a truck loaded with chairs and refreshments to hold impromptu
discussions about his SEZ proposal with local village councils.228 In addition, consistent with the proposal of placing employment targets upon
SEZs,229 Raheja assured the local agrarian communities that his SEZ would
create jobs for two persons per family.230 Finally, in line with the recommendation to include previous landowners in the development of the
SEZ,231 Raheja promised to make the previous landowners equity owners.232
Once Raheja earned the local agrarian communities’ support, the land transfer process was completed within twenty-four hours.233
Procedural and substantive reforms formally ensuring that all SEZ Developers and Units exhibit the same level of inclusivity as did Raheja in de224
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veloping and operating SEZs would play a vital role in quelling the popular
resistance facing India’s SEZs. Therefore, such consensus-building reforms
are necessary for India to maintain a sustainable SEZ policy.
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